diff third_party/luajit/src/lj_prng.c @ 178:94705b5986b3

[ThirdParty] Added WRK and luajit for load testing.
author MrJuneJune <me@mrjunejune.com>
date Thu, 22 Jan 2026 20:10:30 -0800
parents
children
line wrap: on
line diff
--- /dev/null	Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000
+++ b/third_party/luajit/src/lj_prng.c	Thu Jan 22 20:10:30 2026 -0800
@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
+/*
+** Pseudo-random number generation.
+** Copyright (C) 2005-2023 Mike Pall. See Copyright Notice in luajit.h
+*/
+
+#define lj_prng_c
+#define LUA_CORE
+
+/* To get the syscall prototype. */
+#if defined(__linux__) && !defined(_GNU_SOURCE)
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#endif
+
+#include "lj_def.h"
+#include "lj_arch.h"
+#include "lj_prng.h"
+
+/* -- PRNG step function -------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* This implements a Tausworthe PRNG with period 2^223. Based on:
+**   Tables of maximally-equidistributed combined LFSR generators,
+**   Pierre L'Ecuyer, 1991, table 3, 1st entry.
+** Full-period ME-CF generator with L=64, J=4, k=223, N1=49.
+**
+** Important note: This PRNG is NOT suitable for cryptographic use!
+**
+** But it works fine for math.random(), which has an API that's not
+** suitable for cryptography, anyway.
+**
+** When used as a securely seeded global PRNG, it substantially raises
+** the difficulty for various attacks on the VM.
+*/
+
+/* Update generator i and compute a running xor of all states. */
+#define TW223_GEN(rs, z, r, i, k, q, s) \
+  z = rs->u[i]; \
+  z = (((z<<q)^z) >> (k-s)) ^ ((z&((uint64_t)(int64_t)-1 << (64-k)))<<s); \
+  r ^= z; rs->u[i] = z;
+
+#define TW223_STEP(rs, z, r) \
+  TW223_GEN(rs, z, r, 0, 63, 31, 18) \
+  TW223_GEN(rs, z, r, 1, 58, 19, 28) \
+  TW223_GEN(rs, z, r, 2, 55, 24,  7) \
+  TW223_GEN(rs, z, r, 3, 47, 21,  8)
+
+/* PRNG step function with uint64_t result. */
+LJ_NOINLINE uint64_t LJ_FASTCALL lj_prng_u64(PRNGState *rs)
+{
+  uint64_t z, r = 0;
+  TW223_STEP(rs, z, r)
+  return r;
+}
+
+/* PRNG step function with double in uint64_t result. */
+LJ_NOINLINE uint64_t LJ_FASTCALL lj_prng_u64d(PRNGState *rs)
+{
+  uint64_t z, r = 0;
+  TW223_STEP(rs, z, r)
+  /* Returns a double bit pattern in the range 1.0 <= d < 2.0. */
+  return (r & U64x(000fffff,ffffffff)) | U64x(3ff00000,00000000);
+}
+
+/* Condition seed: ensure k[i] MSB of u[i] are non-zero. */
+static LJ_AINLINE void lj_prng_condition(PRNGState *rs)
+{
+  if (rs->u[0] < (1u << 1)) rs->u[0] += (1u << 1);
+  if (rs->u[1] < (1u << 6)) rs->u[1] += (1u << 6);
+  if (rs->u[2] < (1u << 9)) rs->u[2] += (1u << 9);
+  if (rs->u[3] < (1u << 17)) rs->u[3] += (1u << 17);
+}
+
+/* -- PRNG seeding from OS ------------------------------------------------ */
+
+#if LUAJIT_SECURITY_PRNG == 0
+
+/* Nothing to define. */
+
+#elif LJ_TARGET_XBOX360
+
+extern int XNetRandom(void *buf, unsigned int len);
+
+#elif LJ_TARGET_PS3
+
+extern int sys_get_random_number(void *buf, uint64_t len);
+
+#elif LJ_TARGET_PS4 || LJ_TARGET_PS5 || LJ_TARGET_PSVITA
+
+extern int sceRandomGetRandomNumber(void *buf, size_t len);
+
+#elif LJ_TARGET_NX
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#elif LJ_TARGET_WINDOWS || LJ_TARGET_XBOXONE
+
+#define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN
+#include <windows.h>
+
+#if LJ_TARGET_UWP || LJ_TARGET_XBOXONE
+/* Must use BCryptGenRandom. */
+#include <bcrypt.h>
+#pragma comment(lib, "bcrypt.lib")
+#else
+/* If you wonder about this mess, then search online for RtlGenRandom. */
+typedef BOOLEAN (WINAPI *PRGR)(void *buf, ULONG len);
+static PRGR libfunc_rgr;
+#endif
+
+#elif LJ_TARGET_POSIX
+
+#if LJ_TARGET_LINUX
+/* Avoid a dependency on glibc 2.25+ and use the getrandom syscall instead. */
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#else
+
+#if LJ_TARGET_OSX && !LJ_TARGET_IOS
+/*
+** In their infinite wisdom Apple decided to disallow getentropy() in the
+** iOS App Store. Even though the call is common to all BSD-ish OS, it's
+** recommended by Apple in their own security-related docs, and, to top
+** off the foolery, /dev/urandom is handled by the same kernel code,
+** yet accessing it is actually permitted (but less efficient).
+*/
+#include <Availability.h>
+#if __MAC_OS_X_VERSION_MIN_REQUIRED >= 101200
+#define LJ_TARGET_HAS_GETENTROPY	1
+#endif
+#elif (LJ_TARGET_BSD && !defined(__NetBSD__)) || LJ_TARGET_SOLARIS || LJ_TARGET_CYGWIN || LJ_TARGET_QNX
+#define LJ_TARGET_HAS_GETENTROPY	1
+#endif
+
+#if LJ_TARGET_HAS_GETENTROPY
+extern int getentropy(void *buf, size_t len)
+#ifdef __ELF__
+  __attribute__((weak))
+#endif
+;
+#endif
+
+#endif
+
+/* For the /dev/urandom fallback. */
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#endif
+
+#if LUAJIT_SECURITY_PRNG == 0
+
+/* If you really don't care about security, then define
+** LUAJIT_SECURITY_PRNG=0. This yields a predictable seed
+** and provides NO SECURITY against various attacks on the VM.
+**
+** BTW: This is NOT the way to get predictable table iteration,
+** predictable trace generation, predictable bytecode generation, etc.
+*/
+int LJ_FASTCALL lj_prng_seed_secure(PRNGState *rs)
+{
+  lj_prng_seed_fixed(rs);  /* The fixed seed is already conditioned. */
+  return 1;
+}
+
+#else
+
+/* Securely seed PRNG from system entropy. Returns 0 on failure. */
+int LJ_FASTCALL lj_prng_seed_secure(PRNGState *rs)
+{
+#if LJ_TARGET_XBOX360
+
+  if (XNetRandom(rs->u, (unsigned int)sizeof(rs->u)) == 0)
+    goto ok;
+
+#elif LJ_TARGET_PS3
+
+  if (sys_get_random_number(rs->u, sizeof(rs->u)) == 0)
+    goto ok;
+
+#elif LJ_TARGET_PS4 || LJ_TARGET_PS5 || LJ_TARGET_PSVITA
+
+  if (sceRandomGetRandomNumber(rs->u, sizeof(rs->u)) == 0)
+    goto ok;
+
+#elif LJ_TARGET_NX
+
+  if (getentropy(rs->u, sizeof(rs->u)) == 0)
+    goto ok;
+
+#elif LJ_TARGET_UWP || LJ_TARGET_XBOXONE
+
+  if (BCryptGenRandom(NULL, (PUCHAR)(rs->u), (ULONG)sizeof(rs->u),
+		      BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG) >= 0)
+    goto ok;
+
+#elif LJ_TARGET_WINDOWS
+
+  /* Keep the library loaded in case multiple VMs are started. */
+  if (!libfunc_rgr) {
+    HMODULE lib = LJ_WIN_LOADLIBA("advapi32.dll");
+    if (!lib) return 0;
+    libfunc_rgr = (PRGR)GetProcAddress(lib, "SystemFunction036");
+    if (!libfunc_rgr) return 0;
+  }
+  if (libfunc_rgr(rs->u, (ULONG)sizeof(rs->u)))
+    goto ok;
+
+#elif LJ_TARGET_POSIX
+
+#if LJ_TARGET_LINUX && defined(SYS_getrandom)
+
+  if (syscall(SYS_getrandom, rs->u, sizeof(rs->u), 0) == (long)sizeof(rs->u))
+    goto ok;
+
+#elif LJ_TARGET_HAS_GETENTROPY
+
+#ifdef __ELF__
+  if (&getentropy && getentropy(rs->u, sizeof(rs->u)) == 0)
+    goto ok;
+#else
+  if (getentropy(rs->u, sizeof(rs->u)) == 0)
+    goto ok;
+#endif
+
+#endif
+
+  /* Fallback to /dev/urandom. This may fail if the device is not
+  ** existent or accessible in a chroot or container, or if the process
+  ** or the OS ran out of file descriptors.
+  */
+  {
+    int fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC);
+    if (fd != -1) {
+      ssize_t n = read(fd, rs->u, sizeof(rs->u));
+      (void)close(fd);
+      if (n == (ssize_t)sizeof(rs->u))
+	goto ok;
+    }
+  }
+
+#else
+
+  /* Add an elif above for your OS with a secure PRNG seed.
+  ** Note that fiddling around with rand(), getpid(), time() or coercing
+  ** ASLR to yield a few bits of randomness is not helpful.
+  ** If you don't want any security, then don't pretend you have any
+  ** and simply define LUAJIT_SECURITY_PRNG=0 for the build.
+  */
+#error "Missing secure PRNG seed for this OS"
+
+#endif
+  return 0;  /* Fail. */
+
+ok:
+  lj_prng_condition(rs);
+  (void)lj_prng_u64(rs);
+  return 1;  /* Success. */
+}
+
+#endif
+